Deep Control (eBook)

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Essays on Free Will and Value

Autor: John Martin Fischer

CHF 52.25

ISBN: 978-0-19-987667-9

Einband: PDF

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In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control." Fischer defines deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control." Our freedom consists of the power to add to the given past, holding fixed the laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must be able to interpret our actions as extensions of a line that represents the actual past. In "connecting the dots," we engage in a distinctive sort of self-expression. In the first group of essays in this volume, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alterative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. Thus, the line need not branch off at crucial points (where the branches represent genuine metaphysical possibilities). In the remaining essays in the collection he demonstrates that deep control is the freedom condition on moral responsibility. In so arguing, Fischer contends that total control is too much to ask--it is a form of "metaphysical megalomania." So we do not need to "trace back" all the way to the beginning of the line (or even farther) in seeking the relevant kind of freedom or control. Additionally, he contends that various kinds of "superficial control"--such as versions of "conditional freedom" and "judgment-sensitivity" are too shallow; they don't trace back far enough along the line. In short, Fischer argues that, in seeking the freedom that grounds moral responsibility, we need to carve out a middle ground between superficiality and excessive penetration. Deep Control is the "middle way." Fischer presents a new argument that deep control is compatible not just with causal determinism, but also causal indeterminism. He thus tackles the luck problem and shows that the solution to this problem is parallel in important ways to the considerations in favor of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.

Autor	Fischer, John Martin
Verlag	Oxford University Press
Einband	PDF
Erscheinungsjahr	2011
Ausgabekennzeichen	Englisch
Masse	1'869 KB

Über den Autor John Martin Fischer

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. In 2017 he was named a University Professor in the University of California. He has held a UC Presidential Chair and is a Past President of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. Fischer has published widely on the topics of this debate, including two monographs, The Metaphysics of Free Will and (with Mark Ravizza) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Four collections of his essays have been published by Oxford University Press: My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, and Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will.ROBERT KANE is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Law at The University of Texas at Austin, where he was named an inaugural member of the Academy of Distinguished Teachers in 1995. He is editor of two editions of Oxford Handbook of Free Will, and the author of nine books and eighty articles on mind, action, value, ethics, and free will, including Free Will and Values, Through the Moral Maze, The Significance of Free Will, Ethics and the Quest for Wisdom, and A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. In 2017, Kane received the Albert Nelson Marquis Lifetime Achievement Award by Marquis Who's Who.DERK PEREBOOM is Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University. His areas of research include free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, and early modern philosophy, especially Kant. He is the author of Living without Free Will, Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, and Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. He has published articles on free will and moral responsibility, consciousness and physicalism, nonreductive materialism, and on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology.MANUEL VARGAS is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California San Diego. He writes about the overlap of moral and psychological issues concerning human agency and freedom, the history of philosophy in Latin America, and philosophical problems concerning social identities. He is the author of Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, which was awarded the APA Book Prize in 2015. He is the author of the forthcoming Mexican Philosophy and the co-editor of Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology and Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman.